Chapter 13 Dynamic Representation in Britain Mark Franklin and Christina Hughes
Was the election of 1997 a critical election? The size of the Labour landslide was certainly surprising, but surprise has to do with poor prediction, not with underlying changes in the basis of voting choice. If there has been a critical election in Britain since 1945 we would like to argue that it was the election of October 1974, not that of 1997.
In point of fact, the major change that has occurred in British politics in recent years is very hard to date because processes of change took several elections to work themselves out. From one perspective, the change can be dated to as early as 1970, the first election in which class voting broke down to any substantial degree, yielding a great many Tory votes from individuals who would in previous elections have voted Labour and (more importantly) many Labour votes from those who previously would have voted Tory (Crewe, Sarlvik and Alt, 1977; Franklin 1982) . From a different perspective the change can be dated as late as 1983, the first election to show that the party system itself was at risk in the new circumstances of British electoral politics. We choose to focus on 1974 as the really critical election in this sequence partly because that was the first one in which the new issue basis of voting choice manifested itself in an election outcome that was clearly different from what would have been possible in what Samuel Beer once called the 'collectivist age' (Beer, 1969) . We want to argue that the General Election of 1974 marked the start of a new age in British electoral politics, whereas that of 1997 was just a milestone to mark its progress.
In this chapter we are going to do more than just defend the contention that the decline of class voting in Britain was the critical development leading eventually to the surprising outcome of the 1997 British General Election (Franklin 1985) . That would be merely to go over old ground.
1 Instead we are going to paint a picture of evolving British politics in elections starting with that of 1974 that, we will argue, is a picture of dynamic adaptation of parties to voters' issue concerns, and of voters to parties' issue stances -a picture quite different in important respects from any that could have been painted during the collectivist age. We will also suggest that, within a broader perspective, the collectivist age itself can be viewed as an episode in what, in the American context, McEuan, Erikson and Stimpson (1995) have called 'dynamic representation'. What happened with the decline of class voting was that previous limits on the scope of British politics were removed, allowing the issue basis of electoral choice to expand from a single dimension into more than one dimension so that dynamic representation became possible on a more general basis than
1 The contention has been disputed by Heath, Jowell and Curtis (1985; 1990) on the basis of several different arguments which in turn were disputed by Crewe (1986) giving rise to a response by Heath, Jowell and Curtis (1987) . Franklin (1988) has pointed out that there is no disagreement about the fact that there was lower class voting after 1970 than before, merely about whether this drop should be characterized as a 'decline '. 3 before. The removal of these temporary limits also permitted party support to vary much more greatly than it could have done before, laying the basis for upset elections of every kind -including the surprising landslide of 1997.
The responsive public
One seldom-noted requirement for the proper functioning of democratic institutions is public responsiveness to policy.
There is, after all, little reason to expect politicians to pay attention to what the public wants if the public does not
pay attention to what politicians do. A responsive public would adjust its preference for "more" or "less" policy in reaction to policy itself, much like a thermostat (cf. Wlezien 1995) . This argument has been made most forcibly in relation to particular policy domains such as defense spending in the United States (Wlezien 1996) and integration policies in the countries of the European Union (Franklin and Wlezien, 1997) . In the context of this chapter, however, we want to take a broader perspective, more along the lines of Stimpson's Moods, Cycles and Swings (19??) in which
American public opinion was characterized as exhibiting broad swings in mood over periods measured in decades. Later on, in 'Dynamic Representation' (19??) this insight was linked to Wlezien's concept of thermostatic control by regarding the changes in mood as manifesting a feedback mechanism by which voters react to the changing policy environment that results from the operations of the political process.
To put it simply, voters have policy demands that are catered to by parties and candidates. Parties win office in order to meet those demands. If the demands are satisfied then voters do not necessarily want more of the same; and if more of the same is rammed down their throats they can react quite dramatically against those who do the ramming. We feel that the outcome of the British General Election of 1997 is best understood in such terms. By continuing to produce Thatcherite policy long after Thatcher had been replaced as Leader, the Tory party showed itself unresponsive to the changing mood of the British electorate and the electorate reacted by throwing them out. Pippa Norris has shown how attitudes to privatization, trade union reform, and moral traditionalism -attitudes that had became dramatically supportive of Mrs. Thatcher's policies during the late 1970s -by 1992 had swung back again to resemble those of the 1960s (Norris, 1997: 165-9; cf. Crewe and Searing, 1988) . Party control of government eventually followed suit.
In a sense, much of British electoral history can be understood in similar terms. The decline of class voting can be seen, as one of the present authors argued in 1985, as a consequence of the delayed realization that the socialist project in Britain had essentially been completed by 1950 and that subsequent Labour governments had not had anything substantial to add that would bring about a 'socialist Britain' (Franklin 1985: 174) . The earlier rise of the Labour Party can do doubt be seen in terms of a reaction against the limitations of 19th Century Liberalism. One could continue to trace the swing of the political pendulum backwards in time indefinitely in such terms.
Still, there is an important difference between the swings prior to what Crewe, Sarlvik and Alt (1977) called the 'decade of dealignment' and those that followed. Before 1970, swings that occurred from one election to the next were limited by the fact that established voters were 'immunized' against change (Butler and Stokes, 1974) . In those days, large changes in the fortunes of political parties had to wait upon the slow emergence of new generations of voters. Small changes from one election to the next could be accomplished by those who were as yet unimmunized, but landslides were possible only in elections that saw large numbers of new voters (see Franklin and Ladner, 1995 , for an analysis of the Labour victory of 1945 in these terms). After 1974, however, increasingly larger swings became possible because increasingly fewer voters were immunized against change (Franklin 1984 This story is not one that is amenable to empirical testing on the basis of data collected in the British Election
Studies. However, in the remainder of this chapter we will show that the impact of class and issues on party choice in the years leading up to 1997 are consistent with the general picture given above.
The evolving issue space of British politics
In characterizing the years after World War II as the 'collectivist age' in Britain, Samuel Beer (1969) had in mind a political discourse in which other axes (particularly the libertarian-authoritarian axis) had been squeezed out by the dominance of class-oriented concerns. Both the major parties competed along a dimension that assumed a high level of government involvement in social and economic life, differing only in terms of who should be the major beneficiaries of Government largesse. With the decline of class voting, this dominance of class-oriented concerns started to erode and new issues sprang up to compete for voter support. In particular, concern for the rights of minorities and women, and devolution of government powers of all kinds, started to distinguish a 'new left' electorate from an 'old left' more concerned with traditional issues of pensions, job protection, poverty, and the like (cf Graham and Clarke, 1986: xii) .
On the right of the political spectrum, a new concern for school choice and privatization of all kinds started to distinguish a 'new right' electorate from an 'old right' which retained traditional right-wing concerns about law and order, defense spending, and overly generous handouts to the poor (cf. Jenkins, 1987: 375; Norris, 1997: 154-6) . In other work, one of the present authors (Franklin, 1988) has shown how these new issues can be seen to have moved 5 progressively between 1974 and 1983 to distinguish themselves on a dimension at right angles to the traditional leftright dimension. Figure 13 .1 shows the resulting issue space in 1983, defined by factor analysis of 39 issues about which respondents were asked in the British Election Study of that year (see Franklin, 1988 , for details of how the analysis was performed). 2 The issue space is presented in two dimensions mainly for heuristic reasons: that is the largest number of dimensions that can conveniently be displayed on the (two-dimensional) page of a book. But exploratory analysis has shown us that if we had pulled out another dimension it would have consisted uniquely of the European question. With only one issue defining the dimension, it would be impossible to tell whether any movements The way to think of this illustration is as depicting issues in proximity to each other when the positions concerned tended to be held by the same people (respondents to the 1983 British Election Study survey), and at a distance from each other when the positions concerned tended to be held by different people. Thus race equality is depicted about as far as it possibly could be from prison sentencing, because those who want tougher prison sentences are not at all the same people who are concerned that society should treat different races more equally. On the other hand, such concerns tend to be held by very much the same people who believe that prisons should be reformed -and so those two variables are depicted quite close to each other. The orientation of the variables on the basis of factor analysis is entirely arbitrary. However, and we have manually rotated the space until the lower half of the horizontal dimension resembles the familiar left-right spectrum contrasting those who would tax and spend on services with those who would not, those who support big business with those who support trade union power, those who support more income equality with those who do not, and so on. Other issues then take up the positions they need to take up in order to retain the proximities discovered by factor analysis.
How the vertical dimension should be characterized is not completely clear. Some would certainly see it as a 'libertarian/authoritarian' dimension but we prefer to see it in terms of the re-emergence of debate over the desirability of non-governmental solutions to economic and social problems (Franklin, 1988) , as explained above. In order to forestall unproductive argument as to how the vertical dimension should be characterized, we have labeled it the 'new/old' dimension because the issues in the lower quadrants tend to be those that date back to the collectivist age, whereas the issues in the upper quadrants tend to be those of more recent vintage.
Franklin ( By embedding the European issue in a two-dimensional space we can see how far that issue has moved in relation to other issues (see below).
understand why their support ebbs and flows we can perhaps get some clues by looking at movement in the location of party leaders. Such movements can be inferred from plots such as this one because if there are changes in the locations of respondents who think highly of someone, this is very likely because of movements in the locations of those who are being judged -or more properly in their perceived locations.
How can the events of the following fifteen years be understood in similar terms? The first thing we need to establish is whether the issue space developed further after 1983, or whether it remained essentially unchanged. But the most important way in which the issue space in 1997 differs from that in 1983 is that the vertical dimension has continued the trend established before 1983 (Franklin, 1988) of expanding relative to the horizontal dimension. In 1983 the vertical dimension spanned a range of about -0.5 to +0.3 in standard deviation units, while in 1997 it spanned a range from almost -0.8 to +0.4 -a 50% increase in its total span. The range encompassed by the horizontal dimension, meanwhile, remained about constant at -0.6 to +0.6 (see Appendix for details of the factor and regression analyses conducted for this chapter).
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Accounting for voting choice
How can issues help to account for party choice? One way to answer this question is to place the parties and candidates within an issue space defined for the years 1987 to 1997, as was done in Figure 2 for the years 1974 to 1983. We did this for the later period by running a new set of factor analyses in which the variables employed were restricted to those that all three surveys had in common, and obtaining the correlation with each factor of support for particular those who planned the 1997 election study asked more questions that distinguished voters on new-old terms, this was presumably because those questions were judged to be the more important ones. Figure 13 .2), and was placed even slightly above Mrs. Thatcher (who had herself somewhat moderated her stance) on this dimension.
In the second place, the movement by all party leaders was not only horizontal, but also largely towards the right. This had the effect of moving Labour towards the centre ground, and of moving the Conservatives away from it.
Noteworthy, however, is that between 1992 and 1997 there was much less movement in this direction by the leader of any party. Instead, all three party leaders were seen to have moved downwards -Mr Major especially so -towards a more collectivist orientation to political concerns.
The net result of all these perceived movements was to leave the Labour leader centrally placed on the new/old dimension, and much closer to the middle than was the Conservative leader on the left/right dimension; while the In contrast to the earlier period, however, the outcome (in terms of where in the issue space votes for the two main parties came from) appears to have been somewhat different from what would have happened had all these strategies been successful. Table 13 .1 divides the issue space into four quadrants, and shows the extent to which parties gained or Causes of Crime') had particular appeal to this quadrant; but we still must ask ourselves how the Conservative Party came to lose so much credibility in its heartland that even well-directed appeals by an opposition party could have had so much effect.
Accounting for party choice in 1997
The pattern of shifting loyalties shown in It is hard to make sense of the vote-switching we observe in the right-hand quadrants except in terms of massive disillusionment on the part of traditional Tories with the 'new' Conservative policies once championed by Mrs
Thatcher and left as a legacy to her party. The Tories lost almost twice as many votes in their traditional heartland as they did in Mrs. Thatcher's territory, the New Right quadrant.
Nevertheless, there is another possible conventional explanation for the pattern of switching that we observe, which would be that many working class voters who had been woed by Thatcher waited until 1997 to return to the Labour Party fold. Class voting did increase after 1987. Does this account for the movements we observe? To address this question we ran a series of regression analyses to predict Conservative voting in elections from 1987 to 1997. In order to assure comparability between the years, only those variables were employed which had been asked in similar terms in all three election studies (the same variables as were used in the factor analyses reported earlier). The findings reported in Table 13 .2 are suggestive. There the EU issue has been abstracted from the rest and placed in a separate 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
column. Class effects are the sum of the effects of parents' class, education, occupation, and union membership. Issue effects are the sum of the effects of nineteen issue variables available in all three studies in similar terms, and already employed in the factor analysis whose results are detailed in Table 13 .A1 in the appendix (excluding attitude to the European Union). In the 'total' column the European Union issue is added to the rest. See appendix for details.
Clearly evident in Table 13 .2 is the fact that class effects more than doubled between 1987 and 1992, dropping only somewhat in 1997, though it should be born in mind that all of these effects are very low compared to class effects measured in the 1960s (Franklin 1985: 145n) . Issue effects remained high throughout the period (much higher than in the 1970s) but with a notable drop of 19 per cent between 1992 and 1997 (a drop which amounted to a quarter of the earlier year's value). This drop is quite anomalous, because when voters change their party allegiance it is logical to expect them to do so as a result of issue preferences. So issue voting is generally stronger among switchers than among non-switchers (Franklin, 1985:136; Baird and Franklin, 1997) . The only other reason that conventional wisdom provides for a change of allegiance is a return to deep-rooted party preferences after an earlier defection. But deep-rooted party preferences in Britain are expected to be class-based, and class voting saw no increase between 1992 and 1997 -indeed, if anything, the Class column in Table 13 .2 shows the reverse.
So analysis of issue voting reinforces our findings based on issue locations. From both perspectives conventional explanations of party choice would leave us scrambling to account for voters' decisions in 1997. To explain what happened we need to introduce a consideration new to British voting studies, a sort of Deus ex Machina, to account for behaviour that would otherwise be anomalous. We have already indicated the nature of the explanation that we think is needed.
The dynamics of representation in Britain
The British General Election of 1992 was not the first to occasion surprise. Commentators were also surprised by the 1992 election outcome. In 1992 they were surprised by the small magnitude of the swing against the Tories. In 1997 they were surprised by the extent of the swing. If we do not regard the 1997 election outcome as a stand-alone result, but instead view it in the light of the surprise occasioned in 1992, we can envision an explanation that goes something as follows. By 1992 the British electorate, which had never given Mrs Thatcher's party an outright majority, were tired of Thatcherite policies. They would not necessarily undo her reforms, but they wanted no more of them. Opinion polls presaged a Tory defeat in 1992. Voters confidently expected that if they retained their current preferences the Tories would indeed be defeated.
But the polls were wrong. The Tories were not defeated in 1992. Frustrated voters who might have changed longstanding party allegiances, had they realized that this would be necessary in order to 'throw the rascals out', geared themselves up to do exactly that in 1997. And in 1997 many of them did not believe the opinion polls. They wanted to make sure that this time there was no mistake. So longstanding Tory voters abandoned their party in large numbers in 1997, even though opinion polls had made it clear that such large-scale defections were not needed.
Such a picture cannot be verified with the data to hand. It views voters as interacting in a sophisticated fashion with policy outputs and predicted election outcomes -showing, indeed, more sophistication than generally expected by those who design election studies. To verify the picture's accuracy we would need richer data in which elections are not seen in isolation from each other, or from the nature of the policy outputs that accumulate over time when one party dominates the political agenda of a nation. 6 So the picture may be wrong. But the picture is above all consistent with the view that since 1974 voters have no longer been tied down by allegiance to social groups, and that in their newfound freedom they behave quite differently than they used to behave before the decline of class voting (or, more generally, before the decline of cleavage politics -see Franklin, 1992) .
The main reason why many commentators believed that the election of 1997 was a realigning election was because of the size of the vote swing and seat turnover that occurred in that year. But the swing seen between 1992 and 1997 only seems large in comparison to swings that occurred before the decline of cleavage politics. That decline liberated voters from a straightjacket previously held tight by the slow-maturing and long-lived nature of the human species. When change in political allegiances could only arise from the enlargement or replacement of large portions of the electorate, big swings really meant something. Now big swings can occur for no better reason than that large numbers of voters become fed-up with the status quo. The size of the swing is no longer any guarantee of its durability. Indeed the very fact that the swing occurs because of changes in individual party allegiances makes it likely that there will be a swing back again. We have already referred to the well-established tendency for erstwhile defectors to return to the fold at a later election. New voters do not do that. They have no prior allegiance to return to. But new voters are no longer the only ones responsible for electoral change.
So the message of this chapter is that there is today much more to British voting than class and issues, and the election of 1997 brings us face to face with this fact. Ironically, however, election studies as currently conducted are not well-suited to studying the dynamics of representation in the post-collectivist age. To create the issue space for figure 13 .4 only issue variables that were present for all of the years 1987, 1992, and 1997 were used. There were twenty-four of these. The factor scores were obtained by the principal axis factor method, and the rotated factor scores were obtained by using varimax rotation. The loadings for the rotated factor scores (prior to manual rotation) and the Eigenvalues are listed below for each year separately. Factor 1 explains 13.53% of the variance. Factor 2 explains 7.84% of the variance. Together the two factors explain 22% of the variance.
The vote variables were plotted into the factor space by first creating dummy variables for each of the parties, coded 1 for those who supported the party and 0 for others, separately for each year. Correlations were then run between the vote variables and the factor scores for each year. These correlations were then used to plot the vote variables in the issue space.The candidate variables are dummy variables created from the survey question "who would make the best Prime Minister?" Correlations were then ran between the candidate dummy variables and the factor scores for each year to attain the plotting for the candidate variables. It is important to note that the plottings of the candidate variables do represent the actual issue space of the candidates the correlation between the voters issue preferences and their preferred candidate choice.
Regression Analysis
A separate regression analysis was run for each year. The class variables used in the regression were dummy variables created for parent's class, education, occupation, and union. In each case the variables were coded 1 to represent the class characteristics associated with left voting (see Franklin, Decline of Class Voting, 1985 for discussion of these variables). The class variables were then entered into the regression equation along with all the issue variables that were used in the factor analysis. Only variables that were present in all years were used in the analysis. The European Union variable was presented separately in the paper due to the fact that the original factor analysis demonstrated that the EU variable could reasonably be represented as occupying a dimension of its own. The regressions are presented below for each year separately. 
